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Background: Clinical decision support is a tool to help experts 
make optimal and efficient decisions. However, little is known 
about the high level of abstractions in the thinking process for 
the experts.  
Objective: The objective of the study is to understand how 
clinicians manage complexity while dealing with complex clinical 
decision tasks. 
Method: After approval from the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), three clinical experts were interviewed the transcripts 
from these interviews were analyzed. 
Results: We found five broad categories of strategies by experts 
for managing complex clinical decision tasks: decision conflict, 
mental projection, decision trade-offs, managing uncertainty and 
generating rule of thumb.  
Conclusion: Complexity is created by decision conflicts, mental 
projection, limited options and treatment uncertainty. Experts 
cope with complexity in a variety of ways, including using 
efficient and fast decision strategies to simplify complex decision 
tasks, mentally simulating outcomes and focusing on only the 
most relevant information. 
Application: Understanding complex decision making processes 
can help design allocation based on the complexity of task for 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Clinical medicine has been greatly improved by advances 
in science and information technology (IT). The use of health 
IT in the medical domain has especially transformed the 
culture as clinical practice moved from paper to electronic use 
of health information.  This transformation helped to shape the 
use of electronic health record (EHR) systems and the design 
of clinical decision support systems (CDS) [1]. However, 
clinicians have minimally adopted CDS systems [2]. The 
failure to design systems that fully match workflow and the 
processes of human cognition is one reason for this slow 
adoption and low user satisfaction with EHRs and CDSs. 
Experts have complex cognitive knowledge structures that 
have taken many years to develop, resulting in the ability to 
reason at high levels of abstraction. Decision support that can 
provide high-level, context-specific and efficient 
recommendations at the point of care will improve adoption 
by clinicians as well as more fully harness the benefits of 
information technology for the improvement of care. With an 
understanding of how to manage complexity, decision support 
designers will be able to provide system-level, big picture 
perspectives that can mitigate tunnel vision and support 
informed decision making for clinical experts.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that basic decision support researchers develop a 
broader-based and valid foundation for the study of decision 
making as it occurs in natural settings [3]. However, to 
understand the complex clinical decision tasks it is important 
to gain knowledge about the clinical domain as well as the 
medical decision making process from a heuristics standpoint. 
In this study, the experts represent three distinct clinical 
domains. 
 
Medical decision making has been the subject of research 
since the pioneering work by Egon Brunswik on social 
judgment theory [4]. Recently, dual process models of 
memory have explained cognitive processes in the medical 
domain by differentiating system 1 (automatic and rapid 
processes of an associative network) from system 2 (slower, 
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more deliberate reasoning and mental simulation) [5, 6]. 
Metacognitive processes integrate the different modes of 
learning and memory [7]. The clinician uses system 2 to 
generalize processes by which a correct medical decision has 
been made. Through meta-cognition, the clinician forms 
robust pattern recognition or mental simulation in such a way 
so that he or she can make accurate medical decisions 
efficiently and accurately [8]. Metacognition forces the system 
1 cognition state to be analyzed by system 2. This analysis is 
driven by the experiences of the clinicians where they have 
prebuilt heuristics or a mental model from previous similar 
cases. Understanding these heuristics can help us to 
comprehend the complex reasoning process from the experts’ 
perspective.  
 
Humans use heuristics that allow them to process 
information with less effortful manner for reaching better 
decisions in an efficient way [9]. Simple heuristics can be 
more accurate for complex problems and is one of the major 
discoveries of the last decades [10]. Thus, simple heuristics 
achieve this accuracy by successfully exploiting the evolved 
mental abilities and environmental structures [11]. Heuristics 
improve decisions because they are derived from ecological 
rationality and not from classical definitions of rationality in 
terms of coherence or internal consistency of choices. 
Ecological rationality stems from the fact that we achieve 
intelligence in this world by using simple heuristics in the 
proper context. It conforms to the fact that our intelligent 
adaptive behavior emerges from the interaction between the 
mind and the world. In this study, we explore some of the 
heuristics or short cut mental models that clinicians use for 
reaching a decision point in complex clinical cases. Despite 
the advancements in the CDS domain, researchers argue that 
health IT systems, especially CDS, are designed without 
considering these aspects that underlie clinical decision tasks 
such as medical decisions [12-15]. Previous research has been 
conducted to investigate the factors associated with case 
complexity. However, little is known about the complexity of 
specific clinical decision tasks [16]. By understanding the 
factors that contribute to the complexity of decision tasks, 
researchers will have an improved understanding of clinician’s 
coping strategies when faced with complex clinical decisions. 
The overall purpose of this study is to understand different 
strategies or heuristics that clinical experts adopt for making 
complex clinical decisions. We expect that better 
understanding of these strategies and heuristics is critical for 
guiding the design of advanced CDS systems. This present 
report presents preliminary results of a small pilot study 









A. Overview of Design 
 
An in-depth qualitative approach was used. The 
Institutional Review Board of University of Utah approved the 





Three volunteer clinical experts were interviewed. Each 
of the experts had more than 5 years of experience in their 
fields after general residency. The participants included one 
infectious disease expert, one geriatric medicine expert and 
one palliative care expert. The experts were recruited 
randomly and contacted by email from both at the Salt Lake 
City Veteran’s Administration Salt Medical Center as well as 
the University of Utah hospitals. All the participants were 
male and active in practice. 
 
 




Phases                                             Description 
Incident 
Identification 
The participant defines the scope of the 
incident and is refined by the interviewer, 
if necessary. For example, in this study 
the details about patients’ secondary 
information and demographic 




The investigator repeats a timeline of 
events to elicit accurate information 
about decisions information. This step is 
aimed at getting a clear, refined and 
verified overview of the incident 
structure, identifying key events and 
segments. 
Deepening Using the timeline, the interviewer 
probes into more details about decision 
points, judgments and the decision 
making process. This phase makes sure 
that the implicit information and 
cognitive processes are evoked. 
“What If” 
Queries 
In this final phase, the interviewer asks 
hypothetical questions to identify implicit 
cues relevant to understanding the 
decision making processes. For example, 
the interviewer asks, “What knowledge 






At the start of the interview, the investigator asked the 
participants to recall a recent complex case. They were asked 
to recall a recent case that they perceived to be complex by 
nature and remembered in detail. The clinical experts were 
asked only to describe the cases that they found challenging in 
terms of diagnostic or treatment uncertainty. Interviews were 
conducted at the university or participants’ offices and took 
one hour. After each interview, the investigator gathered 
demographic information about each expert. 
 
 
D. Critical Decision Method 
 The critical decision method (CDM) was used to conduct 
the interviews [17]. In a CDM interview, the researcher elicits 
important information about how participants view the task, 
their goals, expectations and the decision making processes. 
The goal is to uncover sense-making processes for a specific 
challenging incident method in the form of story-telling. 
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. All 
personal and identifiable information regarding patients, 
participants and colleagues was removed from the transcript.  
 





The point of making a decision while 
evaluating multiple options and choices 
Complexity 
Factors 
Factors that contribute to making the 




All types of implicit and verbal 
information including signs, symptoms 
and context that contributed to making a 
decision 
Goals The participants described goals for the 
patient at each decision point 
Action Any kind of actions taken including 
treatment, looking at lab results, 





The analysis was iterative, involving the three 
investigators who analyzed the data in multiple cycles until 
they reached consensus. First, the three investigators initially 
independently coded each transcript (Table II) [18] for 
decision points, complexity factors, decision cues, goals and 
action based on the critical decision method [17]. The 
categories were reconciled through group consensus. Each 
category was then discussed among the reviewers for 




The following five key categories of coping strategies with 
complex decision tasks were identified during data analysis.  
 
 
A. Decision Conflict 
 
Expert clinicians face decision conflicts during most of 
the complex case resolution. Experts try to find patterns in 
patients’ cases amongst this complexity [19]. Conflicts also 
arise when the clinicians deal with socio-technical problems 
with patients’ family. Moreover, disagreement with other 
physicians about patient management can lead to decision 
conflicts. Experts try to find patterns in patients’ cases.  
However, when the patient is very unique due to the diagnosis 
or patients’ demographics, experts face decision conflict due 
to the lack of established guidelines. The decision conflict 
causes anxiety and frustration. For example: 
 
“After awhile I kind of looked back at the pattern of 
infections and it seemed like she was getting admitted 
about the same amount, two or three times a year, and 
was developing resistance to the antibiotics that were 
being used for suppression. And she’s supposed to follow 
up in my clinic soon and then I’ll have to decide whether 
or not to continue suppression or just take her back off of 
the prophylaxis and see what happens. “  
 
“Well, so the first thought is, Do you use prophylactic 
suppression or not prophylactic suppression? And so the 
thought process would be maybe that you would or would 
not. If you use suppression you might have fewer 
infections but they might be harder to treat. So there’s 
potentially this conflict between possibly having fewer 
infections. There isn’t a literature that says one way or 
the other about that.” 
 
“Unfortunately, a complicating factor was we had a niece 
show up with DPOA papers, who said, Take my mom off 
the ventilator right now because she’s a DNR!  We had a 
little bit of discussion…and this kind of sidetracked the 
whole care for a little while.”   
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B. Mental Projection 
Experts project themselves into other practitioners’ points 
of view and try to mentally simulate what course of action or 
treatment of option other clinicians would consider. Experts 
are worried that other physicians might not consider treatment 
options that they are considering or be able to infer their line 
of reasoning. As a result, they work through possible ways 
that other clinicians could view the treatment plan. For 
example: 
 
“…..So there’s an antibiotic that’s commonly used in the 
Emergency Room that you really don’t use in older 
patients with poor renal clearance. And so it does limit 
somewhat the choices of antibiotics that are possible to 
use and it also kind of increases the chance that someone 
would use an inappropriate antibiotic for an older person 
because they’re not really aware of the consequences. 
They’re not as aware of the medicines that we don’t use 
for older people to treat infections usually.” 
 
“They’re focused on keeping the patient alive at all costs 
and don’t recognize that some of the things that they do 
can sort of destroy the endgame. So you can make 
somebody so sick that you can’t do a bone marrow 
transplant or they can be so sick that you should do a 
bone marrow transplant to this patient? It’s highly 
debatable. Having multiple uncontrolled fungal infections 
going in to transplant is never a good idea, especially if 
you’ve failed the first induction. It’s a bad prognostic 
indicator.” 
 
“But we assumed that they would have been the case 
anyway because the Cipro was already only intermediately 
sensitive. So it probably didn’t change anyone’s 
management but it may have influenced them to think, Oh, 
now we need a different drug for suppression because the 
Cipro isn’t working anymore for suppression. I think 
they’re more likely to follow the pattern that’s been out 
there before. So, I think they were probably more likely to 
say, Well, she was being suppressed with cipro before and 
now we’ve lost cipro. We have to suppress with something 
else.” 
 
C. Decision Trade-offs 
Experts have to constantly adjudicate both long-term and 
short-term goals, mentally simulating the possible interactions 
and impact of different options. As a result, they are thinking 
of choosing the treatment option that resolves the immediate 
issue while at the same time trying to ensure the best outcome 
in the long term. We found that decision trade-offs included 
judgments regarding life expectancy versus quality of life or 
curative effects versus side-effect profiles. Some of the trade-
offs involve value judgments. In this process, the experts 
might have to let go certain options for the long-term benefit 
for the patient. For example: 
 
“And all of that with the possibility of missing it or 
getting antagonistic activity. In that particular case, at 
least for a while until he stabilized somewhat, we felt that 
the risk of missing was high enough to justify the risk that 
it was antagonistic. So we’d rather hit with one of them 
than completely miss, even if the activity was lower. So in 
this particular case we gave both amphotericin and 
voriconazole, although I’ve never done it since.” 
 
“And so there’s a timing piece to this too because she’s in 
her nineties. I mean, if they were in their seventies and 
you said, Oh, well…you’re going to have recurrent 
urinary tract infections for 15 or 20 years. But in their 
case the timeline you’re probably looking at is a couple of 
years, three or four years.” 
 
“We’d actually put her on BiPAP just to buy some time, 
hoping that the antibiotics would kick in, hoping that 
something would come up.” 
 
 
D. Managing Uncertainty 
Experts must manage high levels of uncertainty when 
dealing with very complex problems. We analyzed significant 
reports of lack of information, including lack of options, 
evidence, patient’s past medical data, clinical guidelines, and 
even laboratory results. Moreover, conflicts among medical 
teams about patient management, uncertain pathogen data as 
well as a lack of information and knowledge about a diagnosis 
can cause a high level of stress among experts. For example: 
 
“I mean, he had no platelets, he had no white blood cells.  
So again there’s nothing written in the book about what 
to do so we picked sort of the old submarine under the 
polar icecap option. So we tried to cool it off with the 
antibiotics and drain it and hope that we could come back 
to surgery later. We made what I tend to think was the 
wrong decision at the time.” 
 
“ It may have been the first case of that particular fungus 
but weird things do occur. As far as giving broad-
spectrum antifungal therapy, you give broad-spectrum 
therapy and hope for the best. You can call the foremost 
fungal expert in the world and there’s only so much that 
we know.” 
 
“And his thought was it’s probably just pneumonia, it 
may just be resistant, we’ll just put her on these big guns 
and this should take care of it. We’ll know 24 hours after 
the antibiotics get infused, we’ll know better. So when I 
was giving her three days I actually thought I was being 
more conservative. I figured 24 to 48 hours and we’ll 






E. Rule of Thumb or Heuristics 
Experts in clinical practice have significant time 
constraints, including multiple interruptions and simultaneous 
demands, resulting in limited cognitive attention reserves. We 
found from data analysis that they often construct a short cut 
mental model of a complex case in order to spare attention 
resources. For example: 
 
“I think in terms of how to treat a patient. One of the 
thoughts I had was it sort of made me use the rule of 
thumb. I guess, is that you might think about using an 
antibiotic where there’s an intermediate level of 
resistance for suppression.  So that was kind of the rule I 
use. That’s what I learned and that was sort of the 
teaching point to me.” 
 
“If I were to look at it in terms of rules, I guess the first 
one is there any guiding information?  The answer is no. 
The next question really is can you afford to completely 
miss with an agent?  I guess maybe that works. Can you 
afford to completely miss with the use of one antifungal?  
And the answer was no at the time, at least until he had 
gotten stabilized some.”   
 
“Don’t get lulled in by appearances.  The patient came in 
with what looked like what was going to be a pretty 
straightforward pneumonia. The antibiotics should have 
worked, that we did initially. I mean, we were on the 
protocol and she didn’t respond like we expected. So the 
important thing we did jump on it early. I did get a 
pulmonary consult early and when we looked back we 
hadn’t missed anything or hadn’t delayed. But I think, 
that was one of the learning cases to me early in my 
career. Things are not always what they seem. So there 
was complexity there but I didn’t realize it until I was 




In this pilot study, cognitive task analysis tools identified 
specific decision-making features that clinical experts might 
apply to manage decision task complexity. The decision task 
complexity that experts described here can be referred to as 
subjective task complexity. Subjective task complexity is a 
property of task and task performer characteristics supported 
by researchers in the information-seeking domain [20-22]. The 
task performer will perceive the task as complex if the task 
outruns the mental capacity of the task performer [23]. Our 
exploratory study was able to find the specific decision-
making strategies that the experts’ adopt to deal with cases 
that are complex.  
 
Expert clinicians are in demand. This demand associated 
with the complexity in the clinical workplace requires 
extensive mental effort on the part of the expert to find, 
aggregate, and process clinical information in a timely manner 
from a variety of sources [3]. Health IT and CDS could play 
an important role to support the cognitive functions of 
clinicians. However, CDS must provide the cognitive support 
at high levels of reasoning and integration of multiple sources. 
The decision support tools can support several functions 
including minimizing cognitive demand [24], supporting 
reasoning and decision making [25] and offloading tasks [26]. 
Decision support designers should leverage from our 
preliminary findings of experts’ decision-making process. 
There are several key cognitive areas that our exploratory 
work suggests deeper analysis. 
 
 
A. Assistance with Decision Conflict 
 
Experts are facing decision conflicts by getting 
overwhelmed with the data that is not helpful for them. They 
have to integrate complex information from different sources, 
sifting and sorting through irrelevant information, making 
judgments about the quality of the information as well as 
content. Decision support tools should help to reduce the 
decision conflict by highlighting the relevant tasks. Then, 
clinicians could more rapidly target the specific source of 
conflict and the associated needed information [27]. For 
example, if the decision conflict arises due to less clear 
evidence, then an analytic approach of showing all available 
information in a graphical format with probabilities can help 
clinicians by reducing conflict. Future research on the 
relationship among decision complexity, task identification 
and information seeking behavior can help experts to focus on 




B. Supporting Mental Projections and Simulation 
 
Drug resistance and the changing dynamics of the 
pathogen pose a great threat for the patient due to limited 
treatment options [28].  Treatment patterns are changing and 
vary across settings. As a result, clinicians must try to imagine 
what pattern resistance takes, how the disease might mutate 
and what other physicians would do in terms of treating the 
patient in the future.  
 
Mental projection means a theory of mind that is an 
instance of a “common mechanism” for representing actions 
by the self and others. There are two ways to perceive what 
other practitioners think. One is the “imagine-other” 
perspective that involves an empathic imagination of other 
clinicians’ situation and an understanding of their desires and 
needs. The other one is the “imagine-self” perspective. Its role 
is in evoking empathic concern indirectly while doubting the 
other clinician with impatience and judgment. This 
perspective taking ability needs to be recognized by the 
medical community. Clinicians might fail to take the first step 
toward understanding one another’s points of view if they are 
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too heavily influenced by their own egocentric point of 
view[29].  
 
Our research shows that experts use the “imagine-self” 
perspective of the theory of mind when they are estimating the 
abilities and skills of other clinicians. Thus, they use their 
perception as an anchor while projecting other practitioners’ 
actions through mental simulation.  
 
 
C. Supporting Decision Trade-offs 
 
Experts are looking into for certain cues that allow them 
to process information in a less effortful manner. This 
selection of cues actually corresponds to the “fast and frugal” 
heuristic model, which employs minimum time, knowledge 
and computation to make adaptive choices in a real 
environment. Fast and frugal heuristics limit their search for 
information using easily pre-determined stopping rules and 
making choices with easily computable decision rules [30]. 
For example, in our study the decision trade-offs of using 
antibiotics was largely focused on the factor of life expectancy 
and the age of the patient. However, the experts could have 
considered more than 10 different cues. The experts tend to 
give the most priority to one or two cues that make the most 
sense for them instead of weighing different cues. Therefore, 
decision support should be designed based on those certain 
cues in the context of the decision making process. However, 
more research can help us to understand which cues experts 
perceive to be important.  
 
 
D. Support to Manage Uncertainty 
 
Experts face uncertainty due to a lack of clear and concise 
information. Experts may be uncertain due to a missing 
laboratory test result, lack of diagnosis, knowledge, or even 
treatment options. Yet, decision support that can show similar 
patients in the same decision space of uncertainty can reduce 
that uncertainty. This population-based decision support can 
provide the experts a big picture of the patients who were 
treated and the outcome of these patients compared to the 
population. Population-based big data analytics can show 
intervention and outcomes in a graphical format that can help 
clinicians deal with the patient that they are treating. Future 
research on how population-based visual analytics or big data 
analytics can help in decision making process is a much 




E. Support for Rules of Thumb or Heuristics 
 
Experts examine fewer cues and store only pertinent 
information in their memory that they can use when faced 
with similar problems. This process can be explained by  
 
TABLE III. KEY MESSAGES 
 
• Providing simulation tools for better decision 
support can integrate patient’s data with scientific 
evidence 
• Decision support that can provide similar 
patients’ outcomes and interventions by other 
providers can reduce decision uncertainty and 
decision conflicts 
• Information extraction from patients’ charts for 
customized holistic view of patients situations in 
terms of flexibilities of views can help with 
decision trade-offs and decision conflicts 
 
 
lexicographic heuristics that requires decision makers to 
decide which cue will be the most important and then select 
the alternative with the best value [31]. In the case of a tie for 
the most important cue, experts focus on the next most 
important cue until choosing a single alternative. The other 
variants of the lexicographic heuristics include lexicographic 
semi-order heuristics [32], priority heuristics [30], take the 
best heuristic [11] and the single variable heuristics [2].  Even 
when decision makers are searching through multiple cues, 
they consider one cue at a time and thus are able to reduce the 
amount of information that needs to be kept in the working 
memory. Decision support designers can benefit by 
understanding the cues that experts perceive to be important 
and use to make decisions based on these cues. Future 
research on which cues are ignored and how effort-reduction 
occurs in complex decision tasks can shed light on focusing 
decision support logic on those certain cues.  
 
This exploratory study suggests key messages (Table III) 
that we should consider as well as the need to find more 
specific information for a better design for decision support. 
Current research on CDS design does not incorporate the high 
level of thinking process of clinicians [8, 33-35]. The 
preliminary findings from this pilot study suggest more 
studies with more participants are needed with expertise from 
different clinical domains. Thus, we will be able to find 
specific cues and decision points that can be incorporated into 
design task allocation for better decision support design and 
adaptation.   Future studies using work domain analysis with 
cognitive task analysis can shed light on the expert’s decision-
making process as well as the environmental factors that 







We acknowledge that our most important limitation is the 
small number of participants; therefore the results of our study 
are exploratory in nature and should be considered with 
caution. To address this limitation, a full study with a larger 
sample size is underway. Despite the small sample size, the 
themes that emerged seem to be consistent among the three 
experts and can serve as a foundation for our future work. The 
critical decision method (CDM) is based on case recall 
techniques that might be limited by recall bias. In terms of 
sense making, this approach does not accurately explain all 
possible options that the experts were considering as experts 
are quite likely unconsciously dealing with options. Also, 
since the first author conducted both data collections, there is 
the potential to influence the way the interview was 
conducted. To guard against this bias, we constructed the 





In this pilot study, the preliminary results suggested that 
complexity is created by decision conflicts, mental projection, 
limited options and treatment uncertainty. Experts cope with 
complexity in a variety of ways, including using efficient and 
fast decision strategies to simplify complex decision tasks, 
mentally simulating outcomes and focusing on the most 
relevant information. As a result, experts look for certain 
discriminative cues. Incorporating these cues into the design 
of CDS can improve these systems, fostering better adoption 
and outcomes. Future research with more participants will 
provide a better understanding of experts’ coping strategies 
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